IS ECONOMICS SCIENTIFIC? IS SCIENCE SCIENTIFIC? – Part 3



By Phin Upham

Part 3

The third part of Cartwright’s model is the simulacrum. She begins her discussion of simulacra by giving the secondary OED definition: “Something having merely the form or appearance of a certain thing, without possessing its substance or proper qualities.” The simulacrum moves away from reality in order to be able to generate laws. The process begins with a set of laws of phenomena but then develops causal relationships and fundamental laws. Cartwright envisions the simulacrum as a home to these laws. Continue reading


IS ECONOMICS SCIENTIFIC? IS SCIENCE SCIENTIFIC? – Part 2



By Phin Upham

Part 2

In The Dappled World, Cartwright (1999, 31) upholds “metaphysical nomological pluralism,” which is “the doctrine that nature is governed in different domains by different systems of laws not necessarily related to each other in a systematic or uniform way; by a patchwork of laws.” In this view, “covering laws,” such as those of gravity, which hold over several unrelated domains, are distorted and lack realism when we disregard the necessity to apply them differently to the different domains. Continue reading


IS ECONOMICS SCIENTIFIC? IS SCIENCE SCIENTIFIC? – Part 1



By Phin Upham

Part 1

ABSTRACT: The usefulness of models that describe the world lies in their simplicity relative to what they model. But simplification entails inaccuracy, so models should be treated as provisional. Nancy Cartwright’s account of science as a modeling exercise, in which fundamental laws hold true only in theory—not in reality, given the complexities of the real world—suggests that Rational Choice Theory (RCT) should not be rejected on the traditional basis of its lack of realism: that, after all, is to be expected of any simulacrum model. But when RCT has been extended to domains, such as politics, in which there is no necessary reason to expect systemic pressures against people who depart too far from the model, RCT is a simulacrum without any par­ticular claim to expressing underlying causal laws. This cautions against the tendency to rest content with models and to treat their assumptions as if they were true. The question of whether economics and other social sciences are really “scientific” is often answered by taking some view of the natural sci­ences for granted, and then seeing how well the social “sciences” mea­sure up. But an equally illuminating approach might be to see how a prominent challenge to conventional views about natural science affects our understanding of social science. Continue reading